INTRODUCTION

This book tells the story of the struggle to constitute a Palestinian nation. The creation of a nation demands leadership, but it also rests on a foundation of related, but still diverse, social groups, which at once empower the leaders and also establish the limits of what those leaders can achieve. Our portrait of the Palestinians starts from the bottom up, with the social groups that ultimately defined the capabilities and the limitations of the leadership. We are less interested in the protocols and diplomacy of the top leaders than we are in the dyramics and effects of groups, such as peasants, urban workers, merchants, and notable landowners, and their relationships to those top leaders.

Over the three-quarters of a century or so in which Palestinians have self-consciously worked towards popular national unity, the society has spawned two leadership groups. The first grew out of the a'yan, or notables, many of whom were large landowners and whose most prominent figures came from Jerusalem. The defeat of Palestinians in the 1948 War capped the downfall of this leadership of notables. In the second half of the twentieth century, the dominant leadership has resided in the top echelons of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its constituent groups.

The relationship between Palestinians' political history (that of the leaders who presumed to speak for the entire people) and their social

history (that of the changing role of the peasantry and the emergence of new social groups) has been played out in towns, villages, and refugee camps, mostly within the boundaries of historic Palestine. But the intertwining of those histories has also been a drama that unfolded in the eye of a storm, which originated outside Palestine. Our interpretation of that drama stresses three elements from the international environment: the extension of the world market, the impact of politically and administratively capable states, and the growth of the Zionist movement. The first two of these--the influence of markets and states--seem rather conventional for those who have witnessed the consolidation of nations in the Middle East, the rest of Asia, and Africa during this century. The effect of the Zionist project is less conventional, although even it resonates with themes sounded in other deeply-divided societies.

The first factor in the formation of the Palestinian nation has been the spread of the world market out of its original cocoon in northwestern Europe.[1] Signs of its impingement on daily life in Palestine could already be detected in the eighteenth century. By the second half of the following century, the extension of the European market was like a torrent passing over the Palestinian landscape. Peasant life, the backbone of the existing society, began to experience major upheavals as a result of this market extension--new distributions of land, new crops (especially citrus), migration from rocky villages in the eastern portion of the country to fertile areas on the coastal plain, different agricultural techniques, new markets for produce, and more. Possibly even more momentous than the shifts within the peasantry and between peasants and the large landowning

families above them was the development of a new life outside the orbit of village society. Palestinian merchants appeared as the representatives of the somewhat distant and disembodied world market. They became the vanguard for new sorts of economic relations among the inhabitants of the territory. It was they, based in mushrooming coastal towns that had long lain dormant, who first created a loosely unified social entity founded on exchange and economic interests--a sort of Palestinian economic boundary.

The second element in the birth of the Palestinian nation was the administrative, political, and military pressures generated by powerful modern states. The first hints of how new administrative and military techniques could sweep away the old foundations of society fairly quickly came in the 1830s. At that time, an upstart vassal of the Ottoman rulers, Muhammad Ali, swept up from Egypt and battered the Ottoman army into retreat, all the way up to the borders of Anatolia. Muhammad Ali's reforms in the governing of Palestine, later adopted by the Ottomans themselves after they finally restored their rule, had long-term effects on Palestinian society. Local Palestinian leaders found that their old autonomy practically disappeared. They had to learn how to fit into the structures of those who now much more closely governed them; they learned foreign languages, studied Western concepts of law, and acquainted themselves with the international and regional balances of power. Those below the leaders found themselves subject to impersonal laws and to new relationships with their old leaders. Of all the political and administrative changes that affected Palestinian society in the last two centuries, three stand out as truly momentous. The first was the establishment of the British

Mandate after World War I, which re-created a country called Palestine, with its own definable boundaries, after a lapse of nearly two millennia. British rule also provided the umbrella for the Jews to undertake their project in the country. The second was the outcome of British withdrawal and the war with the Jews in 1948. Although Palestine and the Palestinian people survived that war as imagined entities in the minds of individual Palestinians, the practical result was the dispersion of the people to multiple political and administrative frameworks, none under their own control, and the disappearance of Palestine from the contemporary map.[2] Finally, the 1967 War reunited the majority of Palestinians under a single authority, that of their nemesis, the Israelis. In the coming chapters, we will explore in more detail how the extension of the world market and the pressures of world and regional powers transformed Palestinian society and shaped the basis for the nation of today. These forces--markets and states (with the latter's primary tool, war)--interacted with Palestinian society in unique ways, and continue to until this very day. But these sorts of factors have not been exclusive to Palestine, by any means; they have had profound effects on peoples everywhere. Although the impact from nation to nation is distinctive, it also is certainly comparable. It is in that sense that we have termed these two elements as conventional. Less conventional has been the impact of the third factor, Zionism.

There is a seductive force in writing an interpretive history of the Palestinians that moves authors to reduce it almost solely to the Jewish-Arab conflict. Palestinian history is far richer than that. But there is no denying the critical role of Zionism and Jews in the

shaping of the Palestinian people. During the period of the British Mandate and, later, under Israeli rule, the Palestinian nation took form in the context of a deeply-divided society of both Jews and Arabs.[3] Because the Palestinians are at centerstage in the coming chapters and because the Jews, Zionism, and Israel stand mostly in the wings, it is worth taking a moment here to consider the complex relationship between these opposing sets of forces. In fact, as an opposing force to Zionism, we could pose an analogous counterpart, what we might call Palestinism. If Zionism is the belief that Jews could escape persecution by establishing an independent nation in their ancient homeland, Palestinism is the belief that the Arab population that originated in the area of the Palestine Mandate is distinct from other Arab groups and has a legitimate right to its own nation-state in that territory.[4] Although there were moments of personal cooperation, even affection, between Jews and Palestinian Arabs, the two peoples seemed to start at loggerheads in the late nineteenth century. In part, the Jews seemed so threatening to many Palestinians because they fed into the other forces already battering Palestinian society. Beginning in the last half of the nineteenth century, for example, Jewish landbuying exacerbated the effects of land consolidation associated with the extension of the world market--driving up prices for land, spawning a growing group of landless peasants,[5] creating two sorts of Arab farming (one using traditional techniques and growing many locally-consumed crops, the other using new techniques and producing export crops).

As Zionism consolidated as a political movement and as Palestinism followed, the two seemed to grow as intimate antinomies. There

developed a context of mutual negation. Palestinians and Jews rejected the legitimacy of the other's nation and its claims for national rights. Their hopes for the future, each side felt, could be achieved only through the defeat of the aspirations of the other. Mutual denial, as we noted in the Preface, became an essential element in the cruel confrontation between Jews and Palestinians, and it ended up molding the new Palestinian nation (just as it influenced the development of the Jewish nation). Palestinians hammered home this negation of the other to a British investigating commission in 1937:

> You [the British] say we are better off; you say my house has been enriched by the strangers who have entered it. But it is my house, and I did not invite strangers in, or ask them to enrich it, and I do not care how poor or bare it is if only I am master in it.[6]

The negation of the other has been a theme that has extended from the late Ottoman period until the present. In some ways, contradictions between the two peoples that support an atmosphere of mutual denial have become even sharper in the course of the current century. Among those contradictions were the fulfillment of the Zionist dream of statehood in 1948 versus prolonged Palestinian statelessness; the self-perception of Jews as a small, vulnerable minority in a sea of Arabs versus the determination by many Palestinians that time is on their side, especially with assistance from increasingly powerful and populous Arab states; the strong identification of the Jewish population, much of it European in origin, with Western culture, versus an Arab population with great ambivalence about the West.

But beyond these contradictions and the mutual denial that they support lies unrecognized mutual complementarity, as well. In some ways, Zionism was a powerful force in setting the conditions that gave rise to Palestinism, as Zionists helped redefine the territory of Palestine as a distinct entity meant for their own settlement and colonization. That Zionist conception had the effect of reinforcing the notion of a Palestine within boundaries recognizable to both Jews and Arabs. Palestinism fed off the Zionist-promoted idea, supported by the actions taken by the British, of the boundaries of Palestine constituting the basis for a legitimate state. But, at the same time, that idea also strengthened the sense of mutually exclusive futures for the two peoples.

In 1948 and later, other sorts of mutual complementarity could be detected. The conflict between the new state of Israel and the Arab states that began in 1948 has not always overlapped neatly with that between Jews and Palestinians. There is sufficient evidence at hand to be skeptical about the claim that, hypothetically, the defeat of the Israelis by the Arab states in several of the wars, notably 1948 and 1973, and the dismantling of the Israeli state would have led to the establishment of a Palestinian state instead. In fact, the idea of a distinct Palestinian nation might very well have proved to be as much a casualty of war as the State of Israel would have been. The irony may well be that the continued existence of Israel may have helped preserve the idea and reality of a Palestinian nation more than annexation of the territory and assimilation of the population by victorious Arab states would have.

Perhaps the greatest irony is that the seeds of mutual complementarity were sown even at the moment of what seemed to be Israel's greatest victory and the Arabs' most ignominious defeat, the 1967 War. One outcome of that war was that Israel unwittingly resuscitated a flagging Palestinism. The smashing defeat that the Israelis handed to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria shook the faith of most Palestinians in the Arab states. It also undercut the credence that they had put into the notion of pan-Arab unity as a means to secure their future and threw them back on a notion of Palestinian self-reliance. The War also reunited dispersed Palestinians under a single authority, Israel. Israel's conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip now put Palestinians who had lived under the rule of two separate states under Israeli control, along with those who were already Israeli citizens. The new political reality, while subjecting the population to the harsh burdens of occupation, also had effects strengthening Palestinism. Palestinians re-established critical social ties among themselves, including broader marriage ties; they created new national institutions, such as universities and hospitals; and they halted the trend towards "Jordanization" of a substantial segment of the population.[7] All these outcomes, of course, do not mean that occupation has been a blessing in disguise, but they do point to veiled patterns in which Palestinism has drawn succor from its counterpart, Zionism. The irony of history has linked these two peoples, who have opposed each other so ferociously, into a single unbreakable chain.

But even if Palestinism and Zionism seem, at times, to be the woof and

the warp of the same piece of cloth, it would be a grave mistake to reduce the unfolding of Palestinian history simply to its place in the conflict with Zionism. To understand the halting efforts to create a Palestinian nation, we must analyze Zionism, from the establishment of its first settlement in Palestine in 1878 to the Intifada, in the context of the other major forces--the extended European market and administratively capable states--that shaped Palestinian society. Those three forces precipitated major transformations in three distinctive generations of Palestinians. The first was jeel Filastin, the generation (or more properly, generations) that lived through the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the 30 years of British rule in Palestine. It was followed by jeel al-Nakbah, the generation of the disaster, including those who experienced the dispersal of the Palestinians in 1948 and the two difficult decades following. Finally, the third, that of those who reached adulthood after 1967, has been called jeel Tawara, the generation of resistance.

In each of those generations, the vast changes brought about at the base of the society, in turn produced important shifts in the leadership. Part One of the book, "The Encounter with Zionism and the European-Dominated World," analyzes the period of jeel Filastin. Our focus is the social and political conditions in the nineteenth century that defined the character of the a'yan, the notables, and, in the twentieth century, promoted them as the first leaders of the fledgling national movement. We also show how the forces that buffeted Palestine in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries changed the very make-up of Palestinian society. As a result, new social groups eventually broke the a'yan's monopoly of leadership and, by 1948, prompted the

notables' demise as the carriers of the mantle of national unity.

In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, urban notables established their domain over huge tracts of rural land, much of which had lain fallow during the country's recent violent past. The urban notables combined their control of land with new government positions that stemmed from the Ottoman reforms, the Tanzimat.[8] It was this group, too, that gained authority in local religious administration. The combination of land ownership and control of civil and religious administration placed these notables in a perfect position to take advantage of the population shift occurring in the country. The movement of growing numbers of Arabs from the hilly eastern portion of the country to the coastal plain and the valleys, where urban notables held sway, allowed these leaders to extend their control to ever larger parts of the population.

For the first time in centuries, the Arabs of the territory were experiencing the formation of an indigenous leadership whose struggle to create a domain extended far beyond particular towns or districts of the country.[9] Family names that would echo through the years of confrontation with the Zionists, at least until the establishment of the State of Israel, became prominent even before Jewish settlement began in earnest. Among them were the Husseinis, Khalidis, Djanis, and, a bit later, the Nashashibis.[10] Had Zionism never appeared, the challenges for this leadership still would have been formidable. The power of the mysterious market that conveyed the tastes of people whom peasants never even saw was tremendous. Fellaheen and leaders alike discovered that they could not limit the transformation in their lives

simply to changes in what they produced or where they lived. In other parts of the world, too, wherever the world economy encompassed peasants, they experienced profound transformations in the most familiar aspects of their lives. They found changes in their families, as new ways of behaving developed between generations and between the sexes; they encountered changes in their relations to the classes above them; they detected, too, changes in their ties to religion.[11] In Palestine, the small size of the country--even the most remote villagers had relatively easy access to cities and towns--only served to speed this transformation diffusing through society. As elsewhere in Asia, leaders had to scurry to keep up with new needs and problems if they were to retain their dominance. For the Palestinian leadership that had so skillfully taken advantage of changing market conditions and of Ottoman legal reforms, the effects of Jewish settlement and Zionist political activity only compounded the challenges. The major influx of Jews after 1882 had the effect of accelerating the social transformation of the Palestinians. Even for those Arabs who rarely came into contact with a Jew, life changed rapidly and irrevocably. As Jews settled in the central, low-lying parts of the country, especially in the coastal strip between Haifa and Jaffa, the Arabs followed suit It was here along the Mediterranean coast that Arab life changed fastest and most deeply. If the challenge for the Palestinian leadership to maintain its dominance did not originate with the Jews, it certainly was accentuated by Zionism and the day-to-day realities of Jewish settlement.

Having consolidated their leadership by taking advantage of the shift

of Palestinians to the low-lying areas, many notables failed to understand the momentous impact that this migration would have on their people's social relations. Paternalistic patterns of rule, the image of the powerful and beneficent landlord caring for his peasants, no longer fit the realities of Palestinian life. Both villagers and city laborers grew restive, by the 1930s, with a leadership that interacted with them through clan or family heads or that treated them as a single collectivity without recognizing the clear economic and social issues differentiating them from one another.[12] The threat that Zionism posed made the perceived inadequacies of the leadership seem all the more critical.

New urban groups clamored for attention based on their professional expertise or their own growing wealth The urban notables, however, found few avenues to go beyond their old instruments of control--their families, land, and religious and administrative positions--in order to incorporate the new diverse groups and interests into some cohesive Palestinian social and political life These a'yan were unwilling or unable to deal with the farreaching changes overtaking their people. These failures by Palestinian leaders came to haunt them in their primary struggle, the battle against the Jews. Even though the new Palestinian national movement benefited from a broad consensus among the Palestinians in their opposition to Zionism, the leadership could not forge this near-unanimity into popular, unified political action. Even at the moment that seemed to be its height of success--the Arab Revolt that took place from 1936-1939--dissension engulfed Palestinian society The leadership's failure to channel its people's discontent into meaningful political organization wasted the early support for

the Revolt and allowed it to turn into a horror of mutual recrimination and violence among Palestinians.

The upheaval that took shape among Palestinians in the years 1948-1967, jeel al-Nakbah, left a people dispersed in the countries of the Middle East and beyond. In Chapter 5, the last chapter in Part One, the focus is on the social history of the 1948 Palestinian disaster and the years leading up to it. Part Two, "Fragmentation and Consolidation," continues the analysis of the consequences of the 1948 War. We will examine how ghourba, dispersal, affected the most familiar institutions of the Palestinians--their families, clans, and relations to each other. The old foundations for leadership, such as land ownership or administrative positions, proved meaningless in the new circumstances. Other factors, including family name and religious position, quickly lost their power to anoint national leaders In those 20 years of national fragmentation between the creation of the State of Israel and the momentous 1967 War, the Palestinians stood nearly helpless in confronting al-Nakbah, their catastrophe.

The term al-Nakbah was coined by Syrian scholar Constantine Zurayk in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of Israel and the flight of Palestinians from the Jewish state.[13] In the following two decades, al-Nakbah took on a meaning beyond the political loss of the Palestinians and their displacement from their native towns and villages. It now signified a state of mind, a feeling of powerlessness and the inability of Palestinians to control their personal and collective fates. The 20 years of purgatory between the 1948 and 1967 wars left the Palestinians without a national leadership. Their cause

was appropriated from them by the new generation of Arab nationalist leaders in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Gamal Abdul Nasser, president of Egypt and the most prominent of the new breed of Arab leader, spoke of al-Kiyan al-Filastini, a Palestinian entity, but now he presented it in terms of the larger united Arab homeland. Even during these most difficult of times, the refugees kept the images of Palestine vivid. New generations born not in Palestine but in ghourba, exile, also adopted attachments to homes they never knew. The reproduction of old neighborhoods in the refugee camps sustained the old local ties, which were the pillars of a larger Palestinian collective identity.

The dynamics in the scattered villages, towns, and refugee camps laid the basis for the formation of a new national leadership after 1967. Part Two of the book underscores the social groups that arose in what had been Palestine, as well as those that emerged among the dispersed Palestinians. It was these groups that allowed for the emergence of the PLO but, at the same time, would define many of its limitations.

Only with the occurrence of yet another disaster, the 1967 War, did the Palestinians move from the ennui of jeel al-Nakbah to the new stance of jeel Tawara, the generation of resistance. Frustration with the bickering among leaders of the Arab states and disillusionment with their hollow representation of the Palestinian cause contributed to laying the groundwork for a new resistance-oriented leadership among jeel Tawara. On the eve of the 1967 War, a new generation began to vie for a national role through the creation of guerrilla military organizations, such as Fatah in 1965.

In much different circumstances, these leaders, who reconstituted the PLO after 1967, suffered some of the same disadvantages as those that had plagued the earlier national leaders, the urban notables. The prior leadership had turned a deaf ear to the momentous changes among social groups, such as peasants, urban laborers, even merchants. By the late 1930s, the events surrounding the Arab Revolt aggravated the problem of the social distance between leaders and the changes at the base of society. The British deported some key leaders, while others fled the country on their own, adding physical distance to the already-existing social distance. A similar removal from critical social transformations also plagued the PLO, as it was forced to locate its shifting headquarters far from the biggest and most important concentrations of the Palestinian population. The new Palestinian leadership found itself separated from the everyday lives of the majority of the Palestinian people. This distance served to exclude the PLO leaders from some of the most dynamic aspects of Palestinian society--the emerging differences between the generations, the effects of mass employment in Israel, the changing role of Islam, the complex relationship between Israeli Arab citizens and the Arabs in the occupied territories, and more.

PLO leaders have been much more conscious of the contours of social change than the earlier leadership, as can be seen in their attempts to establish grass roots social organizations that would channel and contain much of society's dynamic. As with the earlier leaders, however, their distraction by the immediacy of the struggle with Zionism and their preoccupation with relations among themselves diverted them from important changes in their own people, which were

in the long-run transforming the dimensions of that struggle. The spontaneity of the outbreak of mass resistance to Israeli rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in December, 1987--the Intifada--bore witness to how much both the Israeli and Palestinian national leaderships had underestimated the changes occurring in Palestinian society.

In the coming chapters, we will relate the change of a fragmented peasant people into a self-conscious nation--a nation marked by differences not only among various interest groups but also among communities scattered all the way from Middle Eastern countries to the United States. Our purpose is not to give a full account of all that occurred to the Palestinians during these remarkable and tragic years of their history, although the book will certainly give some notion of the tide of events. In the pages that follow, our aim will be to explain the major changes in the nature of Palestinian society and how these changes have affected the relations between leaders and followers. Forces that began to gain strength in the early nineteenth century and which were further driven by the appearance of Zionism created new leadership, both before and after 1948, and changed the nature of the followers. It is the relationship between Palestinian leaders--increasingly absorbed by thwarting the Zionists' aims--and their rapidly changing followers that explains so much of the character of Palestinian society and its response to the terrible challenges it has faced in this century.

As much as any people in the world, the Palestinians have been stigmatized by stereotypes of them, many conveyed in the mass media.

Whether as "terrorists" or "freedom fighters," as "murderers" or "victims," Palestinians have had their lives characterized by facile labels. Palestinian leaders have, at times, reinforced these oversimplified images by insisting on the consensus of their people, their sameness, while denying the multiple faces of Palestinian society. In the pages that follow, we will present the Palestinians in ways that will satisfy neither those who see them in demonic images nor those who cringe at exposing the differences and divisions in Palestinian society. Our account, we hope, will offer the contours and dynamics of a people placed in the vortex of one of the most volatile conflicts of our time.

NOTES:

1. For more on the introduction of the territory into the world system, and especially the world market, see, David Kushner, ed., Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986); and Roger Owen, ed., Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Carbondale: Southern Ilinois University Press, 1982. For a general survey see, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System III: The Second Era of Great Power Expansions of Capitalist World Economy, 1730-1840s. San Diego and New York: Academic Press, 1989.

2. On the concept of "imagined" nations, see **Benedict Anderson,** Imagined Communities.

3. Although we have termed Zionism as an unconventional force, there certainly are other cases of societies with strong ethnic conflict that could be termed deeply-divided. See Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply-Divided Societies: Consociations Versus Control," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3 1979, pp. 321-349; Dan Horowitz, "Dual Authority Politcs," Comparative Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1982, pp. 329-349.

4. See Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. For the best overall account of the history of Palestinian nationalism, see the three volume history by Y. Porath. The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement: 1918-1929. London: Frank Cass, 1974; The Palestinian Arab National Movement: 1929-1939. London: Frank Cass, 1977; and In Search of Arab Unity. London: Frank Cass, 1986.

5. On the phenomenon of displacement from the land, see John Ruedy, "Dynamics of Alienation" in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 19??), pp. ??; Kenneth W. Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984; Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983.

6. Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission Report. London: HMSO, 1937, p. 131 [Italics in original].

7. For Jordanian policy towards the Palestinians, see Joseph Nevo, Abdallah and the Arabs of Palestine. Tel-Aviv: Shiloach Center, 1975, [Hebrew]; Eliezer Be'eri, The Palestinians Under Jordanian Rule. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1978; and Shaul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.

8. For the impact of the new law system, see, Moshe Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

9. See Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reforms and the Politics of the

Notables" in W. Polk and R. Chambers, eds., Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 41-68; and Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Husaynis: The Rise of a Notable Family in 18th Century Palestine" in Kushner, ed., Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, pp. 93-108.

10. A good description and analysis of the familial politics of the Husseinis can be found in ibid. An account of the notable families of the territory exists in Arabic: Adel Mana'a, The Notables of Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, 1800-1918. Jerusalem: The Palestine Studies Association, 1986 [Arabic]. Mana'a gives biographical data on 228 a'yan, most of whom held administrative or religious offices.

11. Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism. London, Boston and Mellbourne: Kegan Paul International,, 1982, ch. 1.

12. Ylana N. Miller, "Administrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The Impact of British Norms on Arab Community Life, 1920-1948" in Joel S. Migdal, ed., Palestinian Society and Politics.(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 124-145.

13. Constantine Zurayk, The Meaning of al-Nakbah. Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1949. [Arabic] See also, Qadri Tukan, After al-NakbaH. Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1950 [Arabic]. Both argued that the roots of the failure were the tribal, highly fragmented, authoritarian and backward characteristics of the Palestinian Society challanged by a modern, Western-based and democratically organized community.